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THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS
The Honorable
Arthur J. Goldberg*
For a variety of reasons the Warren Court's criminal jus-
tice decisions are most vulnerable to attack. In the first place,
there is a great-and in many respects justified-concern
about the increase in crime." The fact that this increase has
coincided with an expansion of constitutional safeguards for
criminal defendants has led some critics to assume-
erroneously, in my view-a relationship between the two.
Moreover, "take the handcuffs off the police" is a profitable
political slogan, and the courts are a convenient scapegoat on
which to place the blame for our inability to solve frustrating
and difficult social problems.'
By comparison, most of the other fronts on which the
Warren Court moved forward are relatively secure. The reap-
O 1980 by Arthur J. Goldberg.
* Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Justice Goldberg's article is an excerpt from his book EQUAL JusTIcE, THE WAR-
REN ERA Op THE SUFREME COURT (1971). This excerpt has been updated by the Board
of Editors of the Santa Clara Law Review and is reprinted with the author's
permission.
1. Preliminary annual figures disclose the number of Crime Index of-
fenses reported to law enforcement agencies rose 8 percent from 1978 to
1979. When compared with the same periods of 1978, the Crime Index
increased 11 percent the first quarter of 1979, 8 percent during the sec-
ond quarter, 6 percent during the third, and 8 percent in the last
quarter.
For the year, violent crime increased 11 percent, with forcible rape
and robbery each up 12 percent and murder and aggravated assault up 9
percent. Property crime rose 8 percent. Motor vehicle theft was up 10
percent, larceny-theft up 9 percent, and burglary up 6 percent.
UNrrD STATES DEP'T O JusTnCE, FBI UNIFoRM Cimum REPoRT-1979 PRELMINARY
ANNUAL RLEASE 1.
2. "Take the handcuffs off the police" was a particularly popular expression
during the mid-1960's when criticism of the Warren Court was at its peak. Senator
Sam Erwin expressed his disagreement with the Miranda decision, he wrote, "Mi-
randa has left the police handcuffed." Erwin, Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based
on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused, 5 AM. CrIM. L.Q. 125, 128
(1966).
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portionment decisions,8 despite early efforts to undo the
Court's work by constitutional amendment," are now so secure
that they have been called the "success story of the Warren
Court."'5
The moral considerations underlying the civil rights
casess are so clear and compelling that some elected officials
from states which resisted these decisions most defiantly are
now supporting compliance.
The remaining civil rights questions-very important, to
be sure-involve the speed and detail of further implementa-
tion. And the cases involving freedom of speech, press, assem-
bly, and privacy are helped by the fact that many people are
beginning to see that the advances are aimed at protecting
them. Most people hold at least one view which is controver-
sial and which others would rather not have them express.
Moreover, the press-with its enormous resources-has,
for understandable reasons, championed the right to express
one's views without fear of censorship-witness the virtually
unanamous and justified press view concerning their right to
publish the Pentagon Papers without prior restraint-and we
all like our privacy and want it respected.
The press, too, however, has been reminded by recent Su-
preme Court decisions that eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty.'
But the rights of the criminal defendant do not share the
majoritarian popularity of the reapportionment cases, or the
popular appeal of the free speech, press, and privacy cases.
Accordingly, it is the criminal justice cases which deserve the
special attention I propose to devote to them.
The Warren Court's advances in criminal justice fall into
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
4. Forces led by Senator Everett Dirksen called upon the states to request Con-
gress to convene a federal constitutional convention. The target of this convention
was Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which held that the Equal Protection
Clause requires the seats of both houses of a bicameral state legislature to be appor-
tioned on a population basis. The "Dirksen Amendment" as it was popularly called
would have allowed the states to apportion one house of their bicameral legislature on
a basis other than population. S.J. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
5. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MiCH. L.
REv. 223 (1968).
6. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
483 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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a number of fairly distinct groupings, of which I will discuss
three. The first grouping consists of those cases in which the
Warren Court sought to eliminate the invidious effects of pov-
erty on individuals' constitutional rights when facing the ad-
ministration of justice. This category is perhaps best expli-
cated by example.
Before 1956, Illinois provided appellate review of criminal
convictions. But in preparing an adequate record for appeal,
the defendant was faced with the practical necessity of pro-
curing a trial transcript. This expensive requirement created
an almost insuperable obstacle to the indigent's access to the
appellate process. Accordingly, the Court in Griffin v. Illinoiss
held that if a state provided an appeal process, all defendants,
rich or poor, must have equal access. Therefore, Illinois had to
provide a free transcript to the indigent defendant who
wished to appeal. The logic of this decision was well summed
up in the Court's opinion: "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has."' The impact of this simple-and, in retro-
spect, obvious--decision was profound and dramatic. Numer-
ous indigent defendants who could not have appealed under
the prior practice succeeded in their appeals and had their
convictions reversed.10
A second example is the Warren Court's defense of the
right to counsel for the poor. The preeminent position that
the right to counsel has enjoyed in our jurisprudence since the
birth of this nation is easily understood. It is based on the
recognition that our trial system is adversary in character and
complex and confusing to such a degree that, without the gui-
dance of counsel, all the varied procedural safeguards evapo-
rate into meaninglessness.
In accordance with this basic characteristic of the adver-
sary process, appointment of counsel for the poor had long
been required in federal trials;"1 but prior to 1963 it was not
deemed constitutionally required in state trials.12 Then along
came Clarence Earl Gideon, whose request for counsel had
8. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
9. Id. at 19 (Black, J., plurality opinion).
10. See REPORT O1 wiE ATToRNEY GRzRAL's CoMMErrr ON POVERTv AND THE
ADMINISTRATION O FEDERAL CRiikuNAL JUSTncE 104-07, 111 n.69 (1963).
11. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
12. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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been denied in his felony state court trial in Florida. The out-
come of Gideon v. Wainwright 8 was the absorption of the
sixth amendment, making it obligatory on the states to pro-
vide the poor defendant the assistance of counsel, at least in
trials for felonies. Though the tools of effective advocacy-
such as investigators, psychiatric and other experts-are still
denied to the poor in many jurisdictions, counsel can, at least,
call such inequalities into question and set in process a con-
tinuing challenge to unequal treatment of the poor.
The impact of this decision was also considerable. Many
defendants, including Gideon himself, who had been con-
victed without counsel, were acquitted upon retrial with a
lawyer."'
A second category of criminal procedure cases were those
aimed at safeguarding and effectuating already-recognized
rights. This was done in two ways: either by assuring that the
recognized rights could be effectively exercised or by provid-
ing a remedy for violation of those established rights. These
two paths to a common goal are exemplified by Escobedo v.
Illinois1 ' and Mapp v. Ohio.1'
Danny Escobedo, it may be remembered, was suspected
of being involved in his brother-in-law's murder. He was ar-
rested, interrogated, and then released on a state court writ of
habeas corpus secured by his retained counsel. Subsequently,
after his co-suspect told the police that Escobedo had fired
the fatal shots, Escobedo was again arrested and importuned
to confess. His request to consult with his lawyer was denied.
And his lawyer's request, made in person at the police station,
to meet and advise his client was met first with evasiveness
and then with refusal. Escobedo was then confronted with his
co-suspect, who accused him of the killing.17 This presented
him with a dilemma. Would his silence in the face of such an
accusation be taken as an admission by silence? Having been
denied access to his lawyer for advice in this delicate situa-
tion, although his lawyer was just outside in the corridor, Es-
cobedo told his co-suspect in the presence of the police and
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. A. LEwxs, GmzoN's TiUMpmr 237 (1964).
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. 378 U.S. at 479-83.
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prosecutor, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it,"" thus indicat-
ing knowledge of and participation in the crime.
I wrote the opinion for the Court applying the Gideon de-
cision to the stage "when the process shifts from investigatory
to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its pur-
pose is to elicit a confession." 9 Any other result would, I
wrote,
make the trial no more than an appeal from the interro-
gation. .. . "One can imagine a cynical prosecutor say-
ing: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now.
They can't escape the noose. There is nothing that coun-
sel can do for them at the trial.' "so
As subsequent events have apparently pointed up, Danny
Escobedo is not exactly a model citizen. The majority of those
who are protected by the criminal justice decisions of the
Warren Court may not be in a system of constitutional safe-
guards. As Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary, said in a
speech delivered in the House of Commons on July 20, 1910:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treat-
ment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing
tests of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition of
the rights of the accused, and even of the convicted crimi-
nal, against the State-a constant heart-searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment-a desire and ea-
gerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those who
have paid their due in the hard coinage of punishment:
tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and re-
generative process: unfailing faith that there is a treasure,
if you can only find it, in the heart of every man. These
are the symbols, which, in the treatment of crime and
criminal, mark and measure the stored up strength of a
nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue within
it.21
As should be obvious, my categories of cases are not mu-
tually exclusive. Gideon v. Wainwright is a prime example of
the Court's attempt to eradicate the effect of poverty on jus-
tice; yet, being a right to counsel case, it was also aimed at
18. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 492.
20. Id. at 487-88 (quoting Ex Parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-18 (1952)).
21. As quoted in, A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICz, THE WARREN ERA OF THE SU-
pimz COURT 12-13 (1971).
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maintaining a situation in which the other rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights-such as confrontation and exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence-could be exercised. Similarly, Mi-
randa v. Arizona"2 is a case which bridges these first two cate-
gories. In it, the Court applied the Escobedo holding to the
indigent situation. Ernesto Miranda did not have his lawyer
waiting in the station house. But recognizing that the need for
counsel, in order to protect the accused's constitutional rights,
is very strong even at the early stages of prosecution, the
Court held that the states were constitutionally required to
make known at the interrogation stage the availability of the
assistance of counsel for the indigent suspect and his right to
remain silent and not incriminate himself.2 8
Turning now to the other subtype of my second category,
we come to the cases providing a remedy for recognizing
rights. As early as 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,'4 the Court had
decided that the fourth amendment guarantees were "implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause."' How-
ever, Wolf left the remedy for violations of the fourth amend-
ment up to the states. Finally, in 1961, the Court recognized
that the states had failed to enforce the right and realized
that, in fact, the exclusion from evidence of the fruits of an
illegal search and seizure was the only effective and suitable
remedy to vindicate fourth amendment rights. Thus, in Mapp
v. Ohio26 the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule was
"an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case. . . . We can no longer permit that right to remain
an empty promise.' 1
The third and last category of cases comprise those aimed
at providing roughly equivalent constitutional safeguards in
state and federal courts. The Warren Court on this issue
accepted
that the genius of federalism does not require that states
be permitted to experiment with the fundamental rights
of defendants .... The mere status of being in America
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Id. at 471.
24. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
25. Id. at 27-28.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Id. at 655-56, 660.
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should confer protection broad enough to protect any
man from the vagaries of a state which by inertia or de-
sign fails to keep pace with a national consensus concern-
ing the fundamental rights of the individual in our
society.' 8
This categorization suggests that advancement of the
criminal defendant's constitutional rights during the Warren
years was not as great a departure from the past as the
Court's critics would have us believe. Ensuring equal treat-
ment for the rich and poor and for the federal and state de-
fendant, rearticulating and redefining previously recognized
rights without moving markedly forward or backward with re-
spect to the expanse of those rights-none of these alms
seems unreasonable. The Warren Court concentrated on
strengthening the defenses of the individual's rights-
entrenching them along boundaries already set out long ago."
In fact, what the Court was doing can be justified on strict
constitutional and stare decisis grounds.
But to say this is not to downgrade the fundamental na-
ture of the Warren Court's criminal law decisions. They were
fundamental precisely because they were not a mere extension
of pre-existing rights. They introduced an entirely new princi-
ple-a new promise-that where there is a right, that right
will not remain unenforceable because of the defendant's pov-
erty, ignorance, or lack of remedy. These decisions lie close to
the essence of our great constitutional liberties. The changes
that were made were intended to adapt these rights to
changed circumstances, to ensure that they did not lose their
meaning in a new society, to enable their continued, effective
exercise in the spirit of equality, and to allow them to meet
new evils and impediments that the framers did not know.
The changes were designed to give practical effect to the pro-
tections afforded by the Bill of Rights and to deal with the
realities of the varying situations confronting the Court in the
area of criminal justice.
If I am right that the Warren Court decisions increased
the effectiveness of our cherished constitutional protections
28. Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249, 258
(1968).
29. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal courts and the
exclusionary rule); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (inadmissibility of
an improperly obtained confession).
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without significantly affecting the crime rate, which statistics
have proved, 80 then one must be concerned about recent deci-
sions of the Burger Court cutting back on these and other im-
portant protections.
The decisions that particularly concern me are of two
kinds: First, there are those chipping away at particular provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights.31 This has happened most dramati-
cally in the area of search and seizure." Without actually
overruling Mapp, the present Court has riddled it so full of
loopholes as to render its effect almost meaningless.38
Second, equally disturbing are those cases in which the
present Court seems to be closing doors to citizens seeking to
assert constitutional rights." The Supreme Court is increas-
ingly becoming a Court of last resort for prosecutors appealing
from lower court judgments favoring individual rights, rather
than a "palladium of liberty"8 8 for the individual citizens.
In the non-criminal area, a report, issued by the Board of
Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers, has
stated that the present Court, unlike the Warren Court, is
hostile to public interest litigation. To quote the report:
Class actions, standing to sue, federal review of con-
stitutional claims in state criminal and civil proceedings,
attorney's fees, the power of the federal court to fashion
meaningful remedies--in these and other contexts, the
Supreme Court has sharply restricted the federal courts'
power to protect basic rights. Instead, protection of these
rights has been relegated to the state courts, few of which
have shown themselves particularly responsive.86
In sum, it is my view that if criticism of the Supreme
Court is warranted, it should be directed at its recent deci-
30. Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-And Fight Back With-Crime Statistics, 25
OKLA. L. REv. 239, 245-58 (1972).
31. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
32. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
33. See United States v. Colandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
34. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
35. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970).
36. Board of Governors of the Soc'y of Am. Law Teachers, Supreme
Court-Denial of Citizen Access to Federal Courts to Challenge Unconstitutional or
Other Unlawful Actions: The Record of the Burger Court 2-3 (Oct. 1976) (Distributed
to members of the Society of American Law Teachers).
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sions and not at the decisions of the Warren Court which pro-
tected the fundamental rights and liberties of the American
people.

